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Electronic surveillance strikes deeper than at the ancient feeling
that a man's home is his castle; it strikes at freedom of com-
munication, a postulate of our kind of society.'
Any electronic surveillance hereafter permitted must fall within the
rigid limitations recognized in the instant case or must be a product of
an antecedent order judicially sanctioning such intrusion. If these guide-
lines are adhered to the rights of the individual will be protected in our
modern society.
ALAN S. BECKER
THE PRIVILEGE TO REMAIN SILENT AND THE
PRESUMPTION OF LARCENY BASED ON
UNEXPLAINED POSSESSION
Based upon stolen goods found in his possession, the defendant,
who did not take the stand, was convicted of breaking and entering
with intent to steal following the court's instruction to the jury that
unexplained possession of such goods was a fact from which the de-
fendant's guilt might be inferred. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, reversed and remanded on the grounds that the Miranda
decision precluded such an instruction as a violation of the accused's
constitutional privilege to remain silent, and that the privilege would
be valueless if the defendant's silence might be used against him at
the trial.' On certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida, held, quashed
and remanded: The Miranda decision discussed an accused's silence
in the face of custodial interrogation, not a defendant's failure to
testify at trial. In the instant case, the defendant was free to testify
or remain silent, since the instruction concerned the fact of possession
as circumstantial evidence of guilt (a fact that the defendant could
rebut through explanation), not his silence per se. State v. Young,
217 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1968).
The Fifth Amendment's prohibition of compulsory self-incrim-
ination applies to the states through incorporation into the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.' Unexplained possession of recently
stolen property is an inference of fact which the jury may either weigh
as evidence of guilt or find as sufficient evidence to support convic-
tion, depending on the rule applicable in the given jurisdiction.' The
court may generally so instruct the jury.' A majority of courts faced
with a self-incrimination challenge to the presumption of guilt based
30. Lopez v. United States, 347 U.S. 427 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
1. Young v. State, 203 So.2d 650 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
2. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
3. 3 H. UNDERHILL, CRnsaNAL EVIDENCE § 601 (5th ed. 1957).
4. 1 F. WHARToN, CareN'AL EVIDENCE § 146 (12th ed. 1955).
CASES NOTED
on unexplained possession of stolen property as held that the pre-
sumption is constitutional as it does not compel the defendant to be a
witness against himself.'
The Florida Supreme Court's concept that the presumption of
guilt based on unexplained possession is nothing more than a rule of
evidence that does not compel the defendant to testify against himself
may be traced to Yee Hem v. United States,6 the leading United
States Supreme Court case. In Yee Hem, the defendant was convicted,
under a federal statute, of concealing smoking opium after importation,
with knowledge that it had been illegally imported. A second federal
statute provided the basis for conviction: that any smoking opium
found in the United States would be presumed to have been imported
subsequent to 1909 (the date of passage of the first statute). Defendant
was found in possession fourteen years after the designated date. Mr.
Justice Sutherland stated in the majority opinion:
The point that the practical effect of the statute creating the
presumption is to compel the accused person to be a witness
against himself may be put aside with slight discussion. The
statute compels nothing. It does no more than to make pos-
session of the prohibited article prima facie evidence of guilt.
It leaves the accused entirely free to testify or not as he
chooses. If the accused happens to be the only repository of the
facts necessary to negative the presumption arising from his
possession, that is a misfortune which the statute under re-
view does not create but which is inherent in the case.
7
5. Dunson v. United States, 404 F.2d 447 (9th Cir. 1968); McClain v. Florida, 185
So.2d 707 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966); People v. Kulig, 373 Ill. 102, 25 N.E.2d 73 (1939); Pugh
v. State, 416 P.2d 637 (Okla. Crim. 1966); State v. Kurowski, 100 R.I. 25, 210 A.2d 873
(1965).
But cf. State v. Marsin, 82 Ariz. 1, 307 P.2d 607 (1957), wherein the court held that,
while the privilege against self-incrimination precluded testimony by another witness as to
the accused's pretrial silence in response to interrogation, the defendant waived such privilege
when he took the stand at trial. The court's rationale, that the defendant was not com-
pelled to testify against himself because he voluntarily took the stand, ignores the defendant's
right to object to a given question or area of questioning on grounds of self-incrimination.
The court in People v. McFarland, 58 Cal. 2d 748, 26 Cal. Rptr. 473, 376 P.2d 449 (1962),
held that, while the privilege against self-incrimination precluded comment upon the de-
fendant's failure to testify, the trial court's instruction to the jury that unexplained posses-
sion of stolen property accompanied by even slight corroborating evidence would be
sufficient to sustain conviction, was not erroneous because defendant gave false explanations
as to how he acquired some items and left possession of other items unexplained. McFarland
was followed by People v. Champion, 71 Cal. Rptr. 113 (Ct. App. 1968), in which the court
found the inference of guilt of larceny due to unexplained possession qualified by the consti-
tutional privilege to remain completely silent.
6. 268 U.S. 178 (1925).
7. Id. at 185. Accord, Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); Rosen-
burg v. United States, 13 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1926). Holdings in these cases ignore the fact
that the defendant is not just another witness; he is the defendant, and the possibility is that
if he fails to take the stand, the instruction as to the presumption may be construed as trans-
forming his silence into testimony against himself, especially absent the testimony of other
witnesses rebutting the presumption in defendant's behalf.
19691
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In Tot v. United States,8 the United States Supreme Court held
that an evidentiary presumption is constitutional where there is a
"rational connection" between the fact proven and the fact sought
to be proven. Courts applying the Yee Hem rationale have based con-
stitutionality on the "rational connection" test when confronted with
arguments based on grounds of self-incrimination.9
As early as 1949, in Garcia v. People,'" a presumption of larceny
was successfully challenged on the ground that the presumption vio-
lated the defendant's privilege not to be compelled to testify against
himself. The basis, however, for the present argument against the pre-
sumption of larceny lies generally in the expansion of the scope of
the privilege against self-incrimination by the courts during the 1960's.
Development of the modern argument began with the United States
Supreme Court's reversal of the defendant's conviction in Griffin v. Cali-
fornia," in which comments by the trial court and the prosecution on
defendant's failure to testify were held to penalize defendant's invocation
of his constitutional privilege to remain silent. In the majority opinion,
Mr. Justice Douglas stated, "What the jury may infer, given no help from
the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the
silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite another."'
2
Griffin has resulted in conflicts for the trial judge; it precludes
him from giving the jury an instruction as to an evidentiary presump-
tion as required by state statute, since such an instruction would con-
stitute comment on the defendant's silence."8 Where a defendant's
failure to testify as to possession of recently stolen property was called
8. 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
9. State v. Kurowski, 100 R.I. 25, 210 A.2d 873 (1965) (presumption of guilt of
larceny based on unexplained possession of stolen goods); Burnette v. Commonwealth, 194
Va. 785, 75 S.E.2d 482 (1953) (presumption of guilt of possession of burglary tools with
intent to commit burglary based on unexplained possession).
10. 121 Colo. 130, 213 P.2d 387 (1949). In Garcia, the defendant, accused of larceny
of one head of neat cattle, testified that he bought the animal from another, could not
remember the brand, and left the hide with the seller. The prosecution could not directly
prove ownership of the calf, but the defendant was convicted under a statute declaring that
one who butchers any neat animal is presumed guilty of larceny where ownership of the
animal is alleged unknown and where the accused fails to produce the hide for brand
identification. The court's instruction to the jury, that such circumstances constituted prima
fade evidence of larceny, was held to be reversible error on the grounds, inter alia, that the
presumption violated defendant's privilege not to be compelled to testify against himself.
11. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
12. Id. at 614. Mr. Justice Douglas' view is expanded by the following remarks from
his dissenting opinion in United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 74 (1965), wherein de-
fendants were convicted of operating an illegal distillery following a jury instruction that
proof of unexplained presence at a still allows the jury to infer that defendants were
operating the still:
I believe the charge in that form runs counter to the federal policy that forbids
conviction on compelled testimony, not only because, as my Brother BLACK points
out, it puts direct pressure on the defendant to come forward and testify, but also
because it amounts in practical effect to an improper comment on the defendant's
silence where, as here, he resists the pressure and does not take the stand in his
own behalf.
13. State v. Nales, 28 Conn. Supp. 28, 248 A.2d 242 (1968).
CASES NOTED
to the jury's attention by the prosecution, it has been held that the
ultimate constitutionality of a presumption based on a defendant's
silence is whether or not the jury's attention was called to the fact
that possession was unexplained.' 4
When Miranda v. Arizona15 is read in connection with the line of
cases following the Griffin rationale, the self-incrimination argument
against the presumption of larceny which was rejected by the Florida
Supreme Court in State v. Young'8 becomes clear. Chief Justice War-
ren stated in Miranda that:
At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to
interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequiv-
ocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. . . . It is not
just the subnormal or woefully ignorant who succumb to an
interrogator's imprecations, whether implied or expressly
stated, that the interrogation will continue until a confession
is obtained or that silence in the face of accusation is itself
damning and will bode ill when presented to a jury.'
One inescapable implication of Chief Justice Warren's remarks is
that there should be no jury instruction as to presumption of guilt
through unexplained possession, as such a future use of silence would
be a present weapon in the hands of an interrogator and would nul-
lify the protection afforded the accused by his silence in the custodial
interrogation setting.
Thus, in accordance with recent treatment of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the rule on the presumption of guilt of larceny
based on the unexplained possession of stolen goods may well be dis-
carded in the near future. The better view would be that the fact of
possession is admissible evidence, but that the fact of lack of explana-
tion of such possession is inadmissible as violative of the defendant's
constitutional privilege to remain silent, a view adopted in the dis-
senting opinion by Justice Thornal in State v. Young.'8
The privilege against self-incrimination was originally a reaction
to inquisitorial compulsory interrogations of an accused by eccle-
siastical and early common law courts.19 The major policy basis for
retaining the privilege is to encourage law enforcers and prosecutors
to obtain the best evidence they can procure independently, rather
than to rely on statements made by the accused, which could prove
14. State v. Kennedy, 396 S.W.2d 595 (Mo. 1965).
15. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
16. 217 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1968).
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
18. 217 So.2d 567 (Fla. 1968).
19. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); State v. Marsin, 82 Ariz. 1, 307 P.2d
607 (1957); F. INBAU, SELF-TNCRhIDONATION-WHAT CAN AN ACCUSED PERsoN BE COm-
PELLED TO Do? 3-5 (Ist ed. 1950).
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to be less dependable."0 There is evidence that the right to privacy
will lend significant support to retention of the privilege against self-
incrimination."' Population is burgeoning at a Malthusian rate. Ad-
vanced "snooping" devices and record keeping systems are becoming
more widely, accurately, and subtly used. In view of these factors, it
is reasonable to assume that, in the future, the right to privacy will
be at a premium, and that compelling an accused to give even a truth-
ful, innocent explanation of possession of stolen goods may be highly
objectionable.
On the other hand, the population explosion and resulting deple-
tion of natural resources will make possession of property a right of
particular importance, thus demanding strict rules of enforcement and
evidence in larceny cases. This would be especially true if the current
trend toward a more mobile population continues, making apprehen-
sion and prosecution in larceny cases increasingly difficult. Therefore,
while the rule on the presumption of guilt of larceny based on the
unexplained possession of stolen goods may well be discarded in the
near future, whether the rule will later be returned to constitutional
grace will depend on society's relative needs as regards the right to
privacy and the right to possess property.
ALAN J. POLLOCE
20. F. INBAU, SELF-INCREMNATION--WHAT CAN AN ACCUSED PERSON BE COMPELLEr
To Do? 7 (1st ed. 1950); J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GurLT 12 (1959).
21. In 1890, attention centered on the right to privacy when Warren and BrandeL
noted:
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the
columns of the daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled
with idle gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influ-
ence of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and
privacy have become more essential to the individual; but modern enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain
and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv. L. REv. 193, 196 (1890).
The connection between the right to privacy and the privilege against self-incriminatioi
was clearly stated by Mr. Justice Stewart in Tehan v. United States ex tel. Shott, 382 U.S
406, 416 (1966):
[Ilnsofar as strict application of the federal privilege against self-incrimination
reflects the Constitution's concern for the essential values represented by "our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality . . . 'to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life,"' any impingement upon those values resulting'
from a State's application of a variant from the federal standard cannot now be
remedied.
